Animals Act 1971: Establishing Strict Liability
In circumstances where a horse rears as a response to catastrophic internal injury (something that was not common knowledge even among experienced equestrians) causing injury to the rider, do the strict liability provisions of section 2(2)[1] of the Animals Act 1971 apply? Lisa Jane Ford v Jonathan Tippet Seymour-Williams [2021] EWCA Civ 1848: Macur, Carr, William Davis LJJ
The Appellant, an experienced horsewoman, was riding a 19 year old 16.1hh gelding hunter when, 20 or 30 metres after trotting into a field, the horse stopped and, after being encouraged to go forward, reared up, fell over backwards, landed on top of her and died after a few minutes.
The rider’s injuries included multiple pelvic fractures, a fractured left acetabulum, internal bleeding and nerve damage.
At first instance the judge found:
- the Appellant was acting in the course of her employment with the Respondent at the time of the incident;
- The rearing was the result of a cardiovascular event preceded by sufficient pain or discomfort to cause the horse to stop and rear;
- It was therefore irrelevant that the horse had reared before and even that it had previously thrown the rider on one such occasion;
- Whilst the experts agreed a horse might rear as a result of such injury, that was not something that was common knowledge even among experienced equestrians;
- This meant that the strict liability provisions of s2(2) did not apply because the “particular circumstances” within the meaning of s2(2)(b) which caused the horse to rear was not known to the keeper. Accordingly, there was not the requisite knowledge under s2(2)(c).
Lady Justice Carr said that the authorities demonstrated that it was necessary to identify not only the characteristic but also the particular time or circumstance in which it arose. This was an approach not confined to cases involving horses.[2]
This was the correct approach as a matter of construction and principle, for a number of reasons:
First, as the Judge commented, as a matter of language s2(2)(b) was focusing on the link between the damage and the characteristic. The damage must be “due” to the characteristics of the animal.
Secondly, the reference to (plural) “times” and “circumstances” reflected the fact that there may be multiple causes of a particular characteristic, not that it was unnecessary to identify what the particular cause (or causes) was on the occasion in question when the damage occurred.
Thirdly, liability under s2(2) for an animal which did not belong to a dangerous species would otherwise be materially the same as the liability arising under s2(1) for an animal of a dangerous species. As Lewis LJ identified in Turnbull[3] “… the Law Commission did not proclaim an intention to widen the existing scope of the law to the extent that it would be necessary to catch an ordinary riding accident.”
Fourthly and fundamentally, s2(2)(b) needed to be construed in the context of s2 as a whole. Identification of the particular time or circumstance in question was necessary for an assessment of whether or not a keeper had the relevant knowledge for the purpose of s2(2)(c).
As the facts of the present case demonstrated, it was possible for a keeper to have knowledge of the fact that it was normal for a characteristic (here rearing) to manifest itself as a result of one particular time or circumstance (here disobedience) but not another (here a catastrophic internal failure).
The Appellant’s submission that the circumstance of the rearing was irrelevant for the purpose of s2(2)(b) on the basis that, whichever circumstance applied, the rearing was within the boundaries of normal equine behaviour was rejected.
Rather, it was necessary to establish and identify the particular circumstances that gave rise to the characteristic of rearing.
The case was unusual in that there were competing arguments as to the relevant particular time or circumstance, but that did not affect the approach in principle.
Giving the Court’s unanimous decision to dismiss the appeal, Lady Justice Carr added that the outcome did not in some way represent a slippery slope that deprived the Act of its intended force.
Specifically it went nowhere near requiring a claimant to establish negligence (or some other fault) in order to create liability under s2(2).
Rather, it struck a balance between giving claimants the right to a remedy without establishing any fault on the part of the keeper whilst at the same time ensuring that the keeper would not be liable without knowledge of the particular times or circumstances in which the relevant characteristic under s2(2)(b) arose.
[1] S2(2): “Liability for damage done by dangerous animals … (2) Where damage is caused by an animal which does not belong to a dangerous species, a keeper of the animal is liable for the damage, except as otherwise provided by this Act, if (a) The damage is of a kind which the animal, unless restrained, was likely to cause or which, if caused by the animal, was likely to be severe; and (b) The likelihood of the damage or of it being severe was due to characteristics of the animal which are not normally found in animals of the same species or are not normally so found except at particular times or in particular circumstances; and (c) Those characteristics were known to the keeper or were at any time known to a person who had at that time had charge of the animal as that keeper’s servant or, where that keeper is the head of a household, were known to the keeper of the animal who is a member of that household and under the age of sixteen.”
[2] See Williams v Hawkes[2018] EWCA Civ 1846 where a Charolais steer caused a serious accident on a dual carriageway.
[3] Turnbull v Warrener [2012] EWCA Civ 412

