Meaning of Words: Humpty Dumpty Test Inappropriate
Where a registered pharmacist in a public speech uses words that are alleged to be antisemitic and offensive, should a fitness to practise committee (FPC) consider the objective meaning of the words in their context or, as the FPC of the General Pharmaceutical Council did, take account of (a) the speaker’s subjective intention, and (b) the good character of the individual when assessing the meaning of the words?
That was the question decided by Johnson J in an appeal by the Professional Standards Authority for Health and Social Care (PSA) against the FPC’s decision: The Professional Standards Authority for Health And Social Care v The General Pharmaceutical Council & Anor [2021] EWHC 1692 (Admin)
The FPC found that the pharmacist’s use of the words was offensive but not antisemitic, amounted to serious misconduct, his fitness to practise was thereby impaired and issued him with a warning.
The allegation was simply that the words use were offensive and antisemitic. It did not appear to be in dispute that in order to find whether the allegation was established it was necessary for the FPC to consider the meaning of the words so as to determine whether they were offensive and whether they were antisemitic.
The precise canons of interpretation, and their application, differed according to context. An underlying and consistent theme was that the assessment of meaning was an objective test that did not depend on the intention of the author or speaker.[1]
The intention of the author or speaker was logically distinct from the meaning of the words; the two may align or they may not.
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less”, but that was not how the courts assessed meaning.[2]
Hirst LJ said (in the context of defamation) “Meaning is an objective test, entirely independent of the defendant’s state of mind or intention. Malice is a subjective test, entirely depending on the defendant’s state of mind and intention.”[3]
Upholding the PSA’s appeal and remitting the case to the FPC to determine afresh, Johnson J said that the obligation on the FPC was to make findings of fact as to the allegation that had been made against the pharmacist, which was that the comments were antisemitic. The allegation required a focus on the comments themselves and not on his intent.
The FPC erred in the approach it took. Character was relevant only insofar as it was necessary to assess the pharmacist’s evidence and his credibility. Here, the critical issue was the meaning of the words that he admitted using.
The committee also erred in not taking account of the cumulative impact of the language used. It did not separately take account of the meaning of his comments when they were considered as a whole and it should have done so.
This required consideration of how one or more of the individual comments might inform the meaning to be attached to the others.
In some respects the case against the pharmacist was that his language was straightforwardly and clearly antisemitic (“Any Jew coming in to your centre who is a member for the Board of Deputies, is not a Rabbi, he’s an imposter”).
In other respects, the allegation was that the word “Zionist” was, in context, to be taken as a synonym for “Jew”, and, on that basis, the language was antisemitic.
In order for the FPC to test this, it was relevant to take account of the totality of the comments made.
The FPC did take account of the speech as a whole (and, in particular, the fact that he had said that Zionists were not to be conflated with Jews).
It did not, however separately take into account the cumulative effect of the four remarks that were under consideration. They included remarks that used the word “Zionist” in a context that did not appear to have anything to do with the state of Israel (and so in a context where the word did not make a great deal of sense if it were taken literally).
That was relevant when assessing whether the Council had made out its allegation that the remarks, taken as a whole, were antisemitic.
The wrong approach taken to the question of whether the allegation against Mr Ali was established (and to what extent it was established) amounted to a “serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court” within the meaning of CPR 52.21(3)(b)[4].
This successful appeal by the PSA is one more example the government should note carefully as it consults on the idea to abolish the PSA’s right to have oversight and the ability to appeal errant decisions.
Cases Cited in Judgment:
Statutory Framework
Ruscillo v Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals [2004] EWCA Civ 1356
The Meaning of Words
Rainy Sky v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50 [2011] UKSC 50
Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB) [2020] 4 WLR 25
Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 20
Loveless v Earl [1999] EMLR 530
[1] Rainy Sky v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50 per Lord Clarke at [21] (contractual interpretation0; Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB) [2020] 4 WLR 25 per Nicklin J at [11]-[12] (claims for defamation)
[2] Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass (1872) – see Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 per Lord Atkin (dissenting) at 245.
[3] Loveless v Earl [1999] EMLR CA at 538
[4] (3) The appeal court will allow an appeal where the decision of the lower court was (a) wrong; or (b) unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court

