CILEX succeeds in the Court of Appeal

In this second appeal the Court considered the meaning of carrying on the conduct of litigation, acts that actually constitute conducting litigation and, finally, whether the law centres’ model is contrary to the 2007 Legal Services Act: Chartered Institute of Legal Executive (CILEX) & Ors v Mazur & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 369  Sir Geoffrey Vos MR, Sir Colin Birss, Chancellor, Lady Justice Andrews

The question was whether people working in a law firm or a law centre, who were not themselves authorised individuals under the 2007 Act (unauthorised persons) were carrying on the conduct of litigation if they did so under the supervision of an authorised individual.

The 2007 Act was to be construed against the background of the regulatory objectives in section 1 of the 2007 Act, which included improving access to justice, protecting the public interest and promoting adherence to professional principles (including maintaining proper standards of work).

Section 13(1) of the 2007 Act provided that the question of whether a person was entitled to “carry on an activity which is a reserved legal activity” was to be determined solely in accordance with the 2007 Act. Section 12(1)(b) of the 2007 Act made the “conduct of litigation” a reserved legal activity.

Giving the leading judgment, Sir Colin Birss reviewed the context and purpose of the 2007 Act, the historical context from Victorian times to the 1974 Act, from the 1974 Act to the 1990 Act and the authorities after the 1990 Act.

A clear picture thus emerged: there was before the 2007 Act a widespread, general and well-regulated practice of delegation by solicitors to unqualified individuals. That practice was recognised and taken into account by the courts in The Law Society v Waterlow Bros & Layton (1883) 8 App Cas 407 (HL) and Hollins v Russell [2003] EWCA Civ 718, [2003] 1 WLR 2487 (CA).

Before the 2007 Act it was a matter for the solicitor principal to decide what tasks should be delegated and to whom. That principal had to put in place proper arrangements for the management and supervision of the work. Delegation did not absolve solicitors of their professional responsibilities for the performance of the persons to whom they delegated and did not undermine the solicitors’ duties to their clients and the court. Agassi v Robinson (Inspector of Taxes) (Bar Council intervening) [2005] EWCA Civ 1507, [2006] 1 WLR 2126 was clear authority for the  proposition  that the ambit of the offence in section 70 of the 1990 Act (the predecessor of section 14 of the 2007 Act) was to be construed narrowly.

When enacting the 2007 Act Parliament must be taken to have understood that individual solicitors operated a widespread and regulated practice of delegating work undertaken in the conduct of litigation to unqualified staff. Parliament must also be taken to have known that there was a detailed regulatory regime applicable to solicitors providing for the proper delegation and supervision of unqualified staff. In those cases, the delegated solicitor retained professional responsibility for the delegated tasks.

The ordinary meaning of the words “conduct of litigation” referred to the tasks to be undertaken, whilst the words “carry on” referred to the direction and control of, and the responsibility for, those tasks. The words “carry on” in the context of the “conduct of litigation” did not refer simply to doing acts.

There had always been a widespread and well-regulated practice of delegation by solicitors to unqualified individuals. The offence in section 14 of the 2007 Act was to be interpreted narrowly. The 2007 Act did not make a significant change from the 1990 Act in that regard.

An unauthorised person may lawfully perform any tasks which were within the scope of the conduct of litigation, for and on behalf of an authorised individual such as a solicitor or appropriately authorised CILEX member, provided the authorised individual retained responsibility for the tasks delegated to the unauthorised person (both formal responsibility and the responsibilities identified at section1 (3) of the 2007 Act). In that situation, the authorised individual was the person carrying on the conduct of litigation.

The delegation of tasks by the authorised individual to the unauthorised person required proper direction, management supervision and control, the details of which were a matter for the regulators. The authorised person must put in place appropriate arrangements. The degree of appropriate control and supervision would always depend on the circumstances.

The judge was wrong to distinguish between (a) supporting or assisting an authorised solicitor in conducting litigation, and (b) conducting litigation under the supervision of an authorised solicitor. Both activities were lawful in the circumstances his Lordship explained. It was not unlawful for an unauthorised person to act for and on behalf of an authorised individual so as to conduct litigation under their supervision, provided the authorised individual put in place appropriate arrangements for the supervision of and delegation to the unauthorised person.

Sir Colin Birss recognised the sincerity of the plea for clarity in relation to the question of what acts or tasks were or were not within the conduct of litigation as that term was defined in the 2007 Act. Unfortunately, the arguments in the current appeal had not equipped the court to attempt an exhaustive definition.

The following were unlikely to fall within the statutory definition of “conduct of litigation”: pre-litigation work; giving legal advice in connection with court proceedings; conducting correspondence with the opposing party on behalf of clients; gathering evidence; instructing and liaising with experts and counsel; signing a statement of truth in respect of a statement of case; signing any other document that the CPR permitted to be signed by a legal representative as defined by CPR Part 2.3.

In respect of the Law Centres’ Model, his Lordship reached the conclusions urged on the court by LCN. The LCN model required each law centre to employ a minimum of two solicitors (or one solicitor and a CILEX member) who had been qualified for at least three years. Those lawyers were supported by unauthorised staff, such as caseworkers, paralegals and trainee solicitors. Unauthorised and solicitor staff each carried their own caseloads and represented clients for the duration of their cases. Staff worked in teams made up of solicitors, caseworkers, paralegals or trainee solicitors, with supervision by more experienced staff. Unauthorised staff were essential to the work of law centres. Law centres each had their own arrangements for supervision and their own individual structures. In general, the ratio of authorised solicitors to unauthorised case workers could be as much as one solicitor to five case workers. This model of operation for law centres had been broadly the same from at least 1996.

Lady Justice Andrews agreed that CILEX’s appeal should be allowed adding that in essence the question in any given set of circumstances would be whether the unauthorised person, in carrying out whatever tasks which fell within the scope of “conduct of litigation” had been delegated to him or her, was in truth acting on behalf f the authorised individual. If they were, it was the authorised individual who was conducting the litigation. But if the reality was that the litigation was not being conducted by the unauthorised person or and on behalf of the authorised individual, they would be committing an offence.

The Master of the Rolls agreed with both judgments.