Integrity and the Standard of Proof

On an appeal by a solicitor against findings and sanction of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, the Administrative Court was asked to determine, amongst other things, whether an enhanced standard of proof was required in order to make a finding of lack of integrity: Halborg v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2026] EWHC 636 (Admin) Lang J

The admitted allegations were that the solicitor had submitted proceedings/and or applications which were found to be totally without merit and/or an abuse of process; that he was made subject to two limited civil restraint orders and a general civil restraint order; and he behaved in a manner which caused the court to express concern about his conduct, thereby breaching standards 1, 2 and 5 of the SRA Principles and Paragraphs 2.4 and 206 of the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors (“the Code”).

The only matter in dispute at the hearing was whether the admitted matters breached the solicitor’s duty to act with integrity. The Tribunal found that they did.

The allegations arose out of litigation between the solicitor and Halborg Limited (a company owned by him) against his parents, referred to as Persons A and B.

On the issue of integrity, the appellant solicitor relied upon Hurst v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2026] EWHC 85 (Admin), at [61] and [122] where Collins Rice J said: “[61] A failure to act with integrity is an imputation of unethical conduct. As such, it is more than a portmanteau reference to a corpus of professional standards. It connotes an element of personal substandard ethical behaviour or untrustworthiness – a degree of what lawyers sometimes refer to as moral turpitude.”

And at [122] the judge added: “These, and the finding of lack of professional integrity, are findings of bad faith, to put it no higher than that. As such, they import an elevated standard of proof and of reasoning …”

In the view of Lang J, the observations of Collins Rice J that a failure to act with integrity connoted “moral turpitude” and “bad faith”, which required an elevated standard of proof and reasoning, were not supported by the authorities. Instead, her Ladyship followed the guidance of the Court of Appeal in Wingate v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2018] 1 WLR 3969 where Jackson LJ undertook an extensive review of the authorities on the term “integrity” and concluded as follows:

“95. Let me now turn to integrity. As a matter of common parlance and as a matter of law, integrity is a broader concept than honesty. In this regard, I agree with the observations of the Divisional Court in Williams and I disagree with the observations of Mostyn J in Malins.

“96. Integrity is a more nebulous concept than honesty. Hence it is less easy to define, as a number of judges have noted.

“97. In professional codes of conduct, the term “integrity” is a useful shorthand to express the higher standards which society expects from professional persons and which the professions expect from their own members. See the judgment of Sir Brian Leveson P in Williams at [130]. The underlying rationale is that the professions have a privileged and trusted role in society. In return they are required to live up to their own professional standards.

“98. I agree with Davis LJ in Chan that it is not possible to formulate an all-purpose, comprehensive definition of integrity. On the other hand, it is a counsel of despair to say: “Well you can always recognise it, but you can never describe it.”

“99. The broad contours of what integrity means, at least in the context of professional conduct, are now becoming clearer. The observations of the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal in Hoodless have met with general approbation.

“100. Integrity connotes adherence to the ethical standards of one’s own profession. That involves more than mere honesty. To take one example, a solicitor conducting negotiations or a barrister making submissions to a judge or arbitrator will take particular care not to mislead. Such a professional person is expected to be even more scrupulous about accuracy than a member of the general public in daily discourse.

“101. The duty to act with integrity applies not only to what professional persons say, but also to what they do. It is possible to give many illustrations of what constitutes acting without integrity. For example, in the case of solicitors:

“i) A sole practice giving the appearance of being a partnership and deliberately flouting the conduct rules (Emeana);

“ii) Recklessly, but not dishonestly, allowing a court to be misled (Brett);

“iii) Subordinating the interests of the clients to the solicitors’ own financial interests (Chan);

“iv) Making improper payments out of the client account (Scott);

“v) Allowing the firm to become involved in conveyancing transactions which bear the hallmarks of mortgage fraud (Newell-Austin);

“vi) Making false representations on behalf of the client (Williams).

“102. Obviously, neither courts nor professional tribunals must set unrealistically high standards ….The duty of integrity does not require professional people to be paragons of virtue …”

Jackson LJ also observed that a professional disciplinary tribunal had specialist knowledge of the profession and its ethical standards. Accordingly, it was well-placed to identify want of integrity and the decisions of such a body on that issue must be respected, unless it had erred in law.

The SRA relied also upon the case of Vay Sulip v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2018] EWHC 957 (Admin) where the Divisional Court, per Lane J held that an appellant’s bringing of judicial review proceedings showed he had failed to uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice, and his actions lacked integrity.

The focus of the SRA and the Tribunal was the seriousness of the solicitor’s underlying conduct which led to the CROs: that he was made the subject of multiple restraint orders by different judges was a reflection of the seriousness and persistence of the conduct.

The Tribunal directed itself correctly on the meaning of integrity by reference to Wingate. On that, and other, ground(s), the appeal failed.