Assessment of dishonesty in virtual hearing: Nurse’s successful appeal

Deference to be accorded to a panel’s assessment of a registrant’s dishonesty was reduced when a hearing was conducted virtually with the consequence that the registrant and those assessing her evidence were not in the same physical space: Nurrish v Nursing And Midwifery Council [2026] EWHC 2 (Admin)   Eyre J

The difficulties flowing from this must not be overstated and experience showed that the reliability of a witness’s account could be assessed over a remote link. Nonetheless, the scope for assessing body language and nuance was reduced in such a virtual hearing.

Although panel members were not to be criticised for not asking questions in the way in which a professional advocate would, it was not however put to the registrant directly that she was at risk of the panel concluding that she was lying to them in her evidence. At least some of the comments made by panel members gave the impression that they were satisfied with the registrant’s answers.

The registrant, who appeared in person, was invited to make closing submissions to the panel but it was not suggested to her that she might care to address the question of truthfulness of her evidence and its relevance to the finding of impairment.

There was nothing to forewarn the registrant that the panel was considering the conclusion that she had been lying in her evidence, nor that they had not accepted her explanation of the points they had made based on the references. She was not given the opportunity to address those points.

The legal advice to the panel explained that the crucial question for the panel was whether the registrant’s fitness to practise remained impaired. The legal adviser did not provide, and was not asked to provide, advice on either the test for dishonesty and neither did she give any warning as to the care which was needed in assessing oral evidence and drawing inferences from the demeanour of the witness.

The reasons for the panel’s conclusion that the registrant had been dishonest were set out in very short terms. The panel was entitled to give its reasons shortly but there was no indication that they had given any consideration to the matters to which his Lordship had just referred.

There was no reference to the caution which was needed before a tribunal of fact could safely conclude that a witness was giving deliberately dishonest evidence as opposed to being confused or mistaken.

There was, similarly, no indication that the panel took account of the inherent unlikelihood of the registrant being deliberately dishonest and of dishonesty rather than mistake or misunderstanding being the explanation for the discrepancies.

In considering that aspect, account should have been taken of the fact that the registrant had admitted the charges against her at a 2024 panel hearing (when her registration had been suspended) and admitted that her actions had been dishonest. The dishonesty found by the panel  would mean that the registrant obtained references which showed that she had been receiving payment (on the panel’s reading of them) and/or had been providing care for particular periods; that she then provided those references to the panel; and that having done so she then deliberately gave an account which was false which was contradicted by the references which she had obtained and provided (and which the registrant knew was contradicted). Although such a course of action was not impossible, it did not seem inherently likely and that factor meant that the panel should have considered whether there was some other explanation.

The motivation for the registrant’s alleged dishonesty was not spelt out in the decision and was not something put to the registrant in the course of questions from the panel.

The panel’s finding that the registrant had been deliberately dishonest was wrong and could not stand. The finding at the 2025 hearing that the registrant’s fitness to practise remained impaired was based on the finding of deliberate dishonesty and so could not stand when that finding was overturned. That finding was set aside and the matter remitted to a differently constituted panel to consider afresh whether the registrant’s fitness to practise remained impaired and, if so, the appropriate sanction.