Court of Appeal allows Doctor to Appeal Out of Time
The principal point at issue in this second appeal was whether a statutory appeal by a doctor against a decision of the Medical Practitioners Tribunal (MPT) was out of time and, if it was, whether time could and should be extended: Eskander v General Medical Council [2026] EWCA Civ 372 Baker, Nugee, Cobb LJJ
The doctor wished to appeal against her suspension from practice. She had 28 days from notification of the decision to her and the expiry date was 23 September 2025. On that day she sent notice of appeal by email to the Administrative Court Office (ACO) but did not pay any fee.
On 14 October 2025 ACO told her that they would need the fee of £294. She went to the office in person and paid the fee on 17th October 2025. On 21 October 2025 her Appellants Notice was sealed by the court.
The General Medical Council applied to strike out the doctor’s appeal on the basis that it had not been validly commenced within 28 days because no fee was paid when the papers were filed on 23rd September 2025.
After considering the papers, Mansfield J struck out the appeal on the basis that the appeal had not been brought in time and that it would not be appropriate to extend time.
The doctor applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal the judge’s order and also sought permission, on a discrete matter, to adduce fresh evidence.
The case was initially listed for 12 March 2026 before two of their Lordships and, shortly before the hearing, it did not seem likely that the appeal would raise any new point of principle.
On 4 March 2026, however, the Court of Appeal handed down judgment in Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey [2026] EWCA Civ 215 in which it was held that for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980 an action had been brought in time when the claim form had been delivered to the court office before the expiry of the limitation period, even though there was an underpayment of the appropriate fee.
An unopposed application was made on behalf of the appellant by Ben Collins KC to amend the grounds of appeal, which was granted. The court also permitted the doctor to adduce fresh evidence which was not before the judge.
The doctor had been advised by direct access counsel that the preferred method of filing documents as a litigant in person without a solicitor was by email, although the doctor had indicated that she was willing to attend the court office in person.
Counsel met the doctor in chambers that day and drafted an email for her to include form N161, the grounds of appeal, the skeleton argument and a copy of the decision appealed against. The doctor notified the MPT the same day and they, in turn, notified the General Medical Council.
In response to a question from the doctor, counsel told her that she would receive an automated response from the ACO asking for the fee. She did not receive one straightaway but counsel assured her that as long as she paid the fee promptly when it was requested, it would be OK. He confirmed that the appeal had been successfully filed.
After reviewing Siniakovich, the court did not think that there was any relevant distinction between the case where a claim form was delivered to the court office within the limitation period accompanied by payment of an inadequate fee, and the case where a claim form was so delivered but without payment of any fee. Both were cases where the claimant had delivered the necessary document to the court office in time but had failed to comply with what was an important, but essentially ancillary, requirement. It was no doubt one which needed to be complied with in order for the claim to be issued, but Siniakovich established that it did not need to be complied with fully in order for an action to be brought. That seemed to be equally the case if no fee were paid.
Therefore, the question whether an appeal had been brought for the purposes of the Medical Act 1983 must be answered in the same way as the question whether an action had been brought for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980, namely, that it had been when the litigant had delivered their originating process to the court office, even if not accompanied by payment of the full, or any, fee.
The question whether Siniakovich had any application to internal appeals was one which may have significant ramifications. Accordingly, it was best left for resolution in a case where it did need to be answered and had been fully argued.
Mr Mant, for the GMC, submitted it may be only too easy for a doctor subject to a sanction to put off the time when the sanction took effect by cynically filing an appellant’s notice but then declining to pay the fee, having no intention of pursuing it, which would scarcely be in the public interest.
Nugee LJ, giving the judgment of the Court believed that the problem was not insoluble. He did not wish it to be taken as deciding what the position would have been had the ACO, as it might have done, simply refused to accept the doctor’s notice at all. But it was surely open to the court to tell the appellant that a fee was outstanding, to require payment of the outstanding fee and to direct that if it were not paid within a certain time the appellant would be regarded as not proceeding with the appeal.
A submission advanced by Mr Mant for the GMC was that the doctor sought to file her appellant’s notice by email which was not a permitted means of filing (PD 52B para 4.1 and 5B, para 2.2). However, Mr Collins referred to PD5B, para 2.4,on behalf of the doctor, which his Lordship held conferred a discretion upon the court to refuse to accept an e-mailed application where a fee was required but not paid, but in the present case the court did not do so.
On the question of admissibility of further evidence, the court concluded that all three Ladd v Marshall requirements had been met and that there was no sufficient countervailing factor to persuade the court to decline to admit fresh evidence.
There was little, if any, dispute between counsel as to the principles regarding extension of time. There was no statutory power but Article 6.1 of the Convention provided: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The court reviewed the jurisprudence regarding the fundamental guarantees in Article 6 and noted also that in Adesina v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWCA Civ 818, [2013] 1 WLR 3156 the Court of Appeal held that the same principles applied to appeals by nurses against decisions of the nursing and Midwifery Council’s conduct and competence committee.
The court unanimously agreed that the appeal should be allowed.